Julius Silver Professor, Faculty of Arts and Science, and (with Rajiv Sethi), Journal of Public Economic Theory 12, 399-406, 2010.
Summary. Elite educational institutions have turned to criteria that meet diversity goals without being formally contingent on applicant identity. Under weak and generic conditions, such color-blind affirmative action policies must be nonmonotone in student test scores.
(with Kfir Eliaz and Ronny Razin), Journal of Economic Theory 132, 236–273, 2007.
Summary. A model of group decision-making is studied, in which one of two alternatives must be chosen. Our model is distinguished by three features: private information regarding valuations, differing intensities in preferences, and the option to declare neutrality to avoid disagreement. There is always an equilibrium in which the majority is more aggressive in pushing its alternative, thus enforcing their will via both numbers and voice. However, under general conditions an aggressive minority equilibrium inevitably makes an appearance, provided that the group is large enough. Such equilibria invariably display a “tyranny of the minority”: the increased aggression of the minority always outweighs their smaller number, leading to the minority outcome being implemented with larger probability than the majority alternative.
(with Tapan Mitra and Rahul Roy), Journal of Economic Theory 53, 12-50, 1991.
Summary. This paper is concerned with the qualitative properties of optimal intertemporal programs in a model of point-input flow-output capital theory, when future utilities are discounted. Under a mild condition on the flow-output vector, we establish that optimal programs for every discount factor and every initial state (other than a unique stationary optimal state) will exhibit non-convergence.