Chapters in Books

Displaying 21 Items

Hindu-Muslim Violence in India: A Postscript from the 21st Century

(with Anirban Mitra), in Advances in the Economics of Religion (J-P Carvalho, S. Iyer and J. Rubin, eds.) Volume 158, International Economic Association Series, Palgrave Macmillan (2019).

Summary.  We revisit and extend the core issues studied in Mitra and Ray (2014). The main reason behind this retrospection is to check if the robust empirical patterns recorded there persist once we consider a longer time frame extending into the 21st century. We make three observations: (i) There is a clear economic component to violence, roughly along the lines of our earlier paper; (ii)  There is a new aspect which is assuming salience now — namely, a strong political component which is manifesting itself through the presence of BJP legislators; (iii) Ahmedabad exemplifies the ascendancy of this political component. 

Coalition Formation

(with Rajiv Vohra),  in Handbook of Game Theory Vol 4 (H.P. Young and S. Zamir, eds), Elsevier North Holland, 2014.

Summary. This chapter surveys a sizable and growing literature on coalition formation. We refer to theories in which one or more groups of agents (“coalitions”) deliberately get together to jointly determine within-group actions, while interacting noncooperatively across groups. The chapter describes a variety of solution concepts, using an umbrella model that adopts an explicit real-time approach. Players band together, perhaps disband later and re-form in shifting alliances, all the while receiving payoffs at each date according to the coalition structure prevailing at the time. We use this model to nest two broad approaches to coalition formation, one based on cooperative game theory, the other based on noncooperative bargaining. Three themes that receive explicit emphasis are agent farsightedness, the description of equilibrium coalition structures, and the efficiency implications of the various theories.

Inefficiency and the Golden Rule: Phelps-Koopmans Revisited

(with Tapan Mitra), in Sugata Marjit and Meenakshi Rajeev (eds), Emerging Issues in Economic Development: A Contemporary Theoretical Perspective: Essays in Honour of Dipankar Dasgupta & Amitava Bose, Oxford University Press, 2012.

Summary. We study the celebrated Phelps-Koopmans theorem in environments with nonconvex production technologies. We argue that a robust failure of the theorem occurs in such environments. Specifically, we prove that the Phelps-Koopmans theorem must fail whenever the net output of the aggregate production function f(x), given by f(x) − x, is increasing in any region between the golden rule and the maximum sustainable capital stock.


Comparing Polarization Measures

(with J. Esteban), M. Garfinkel and S. Skaperdas (eds), Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Peace and Conflict, Oxford University Press, 2011.

Summary. We review some alternative measures of unidimensional polarization, grouped into two families: polarization and bi-polarization measures. We take as a base for our analysis the set of axioms that characterize the measure of polarization developed in Esteban and Ray (Econometrica 1994) and Duclos, Esteban and Ray (Econometrica 2013),

Development Economics

The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, edited by Lawrence Blume and Steven Durlauf, 2007.

Summary. Entry for the New Palgrave.

Aspirations, Poverty and Economic Change

in Abhijit Banerjee, Roland Benabou and Dilip Mookherjee, What Have We Learned About Poverty?, Oxford University Press, 2006.

Summary. Introduces the idea of aspirations as a socially determined reference point. The paper argues that reachable aspirations serve to inspire, while still higher aspirations could lead to frustration.

Informal Insurance, Enforcement Constraints, and Group Formation

(with Garance Genicot), in G. Demange and M. Wooders (eds), Network and Group Formation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Summary. This paper, largely based on Genicot and Ray (2003), discusses group formation in the context of informal insurance arrangements with enforcement constraints.

Credit Rationing in Developing Countries: An Overview of the Theory

(with Parikshit Ghosh and Debraj Ray), Chapter 11 in Readings in the Theory of Economic Development, edited by Dilip Mookherjee and Debraj Ray, London: Blackwell, 383–301l, 2000.

Summary. This paper surveys the theoretical development literature on credit markets.

Quantity Controls

(with Arunava Sen), in B. Dutta (ed), Welfare Economics and India, Oxford University Press, 1993.

Summary. We explore the role and necessity of quantity controls in decentralizing Pareto-optimal allocations in a market setting.

On the Economic Theory of Quantity Controls

(with Arunava Sen), in K. Basu and P. Nayak (eds.), Economic Theory and Development, Oxford University Press, 1992.

Summary. We study when quantity controls are needed for decentralization of Pareto-optima.

Profitability and Concentration

(with Bhaskar Dutta, Shubhashis Gangopadhyay and Kunal Sengupta), in B. Dutta et al (eds.), Theoretical Issues in Economic Development, Oxford University Press.

On Decentralization Under Increasing Returns

(with Tapan Mitra),  in M. Majumdar (ed.), Decentralization and Economic Growth, Westview Press, 1992.

Summary. In a model of economic growth with nonconvex technology, we characterize infinite-horizon optimality in terms of short-run optimality and a transversality condition.

Increasing Returns, Economic Growth and Decentralization

(with Mukul Majumdar), in B. Dutta, S. Gangopadhyay, D. Mookherjee and D. Ray (eds), Economic Theory and Policy: Essays in Honor of Dipak Banerjee, Oxford University Press, 1990.

Summary. We discuss quantity controls that can be used for decentralization of competitive economies with non-convex production sets.

Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Eviction

(with Bhaskar Dutta and Kunal Sengupta), in P. Bardhan (ed.), The Economic Theory of Agrarian Institutions, Clarendon Press, Oxford (1989).

Summary. We study repeated principal-agent problems in which the agent can be evicted and replaced by another identical agent. Thus current output, which is perfectly observed, can be used for incentives as well as efficiency wages. We describe conditions under which eviction threats will be used in equilibrium, in addition to output-based incentives.

Interlinkages and the Pattern of Competition

(with Kunal Sengupta), in P. Bardhan (ed.) The Economic Theory of Agrarian Institutions, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989.

Summary. This paper provides a broad set of conditions interlinked contracts will not be observed. These conditions are given to throw better light on the circumstances in which interlinkage will indeed be observed.

An Economic Theory of Malnutrition

(with Partha Dasgupta), in I.S. Gulati and M. Shroff (eds.), Economic Theory and Underdevelopment: Essays in Honour of I.G. Patel, 1986.

Summary. An initial, sketchy version of the Dasgupta-Ray papers on involntary unemployment and undernutrition.