(with Dilip Mookherjee), American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings) 92, 253–259, 2002.
Summary. We explore the view, further developed in our other work, that inequality is an inevitable consequence of the market mechanism.
(with Dilip Mookherjee), American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings) 92, 253–259, 2002.
Summary. We explore the view, further developed in our other work, that inequality is an inevitable consequence of the market mechanism.
(with Jean-Marie Baland and Olivier Dagnelie), Economic Journal 117, 922-935, 2007.
Summary. A group of agents voluntarily participates in a joint project, in which efforts are not perfectly substitutable. The output is divided according to some given vector of shares. A share vector is unimprovable if no other share vector yields a higher sum of payoffs. We describe unimprovable share vectors.
Games and Economic Behavior 1, 295-326, 1989
We formalize the notion of collective dynamic consistency for noncooperative repeated games. Intuitively, we require that an equilibrium not prescribe any course of action in any subgame that players would jointly wish to renegotiate, given the restriction that any alternative must itself be invulnerable to subsequent deviations and renegotiation. While the appropriate definition of collective dynamic consistency is clear for finitely repeated games, serious conceptual difficulties arise when games are infinitely repeated.