2025 Zayira Ray
Julius Silver Professor, Faculty of Arts and Science,
Professor of Economics, New York University
Research Associate, NBER
Spool Member, ThReD
Research Fellow, CESifo


Department of Economics, 
New York University,
19 West 4th Street
New York, NY 10012, U.S.A.
debraj.ray@nyu.edu, +1 (212)-998-8906.

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Oxford University Press, 2008. This book is now open-access; feel free to download a copy, and to buy the print version if you like the book.
≋ Three Randomly Selected Papers
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Is Equality Stable?

(with Dilip Mookherjee), American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings) 92, 253–259, 2002.

Summary. We explore the view, further developed in our other work, that inequality is an inevitable consequence of the market mechanism.

Contractual Structure and Wealth Accumulation

(with Dilip Mookherjee), American Economic Review 92, 818–849, 2002. Online Appendix.

Summary. Can historical wealth distributions affect long-run output and inequality despite “rational” saving, convex technology and no externalities? We consider a model of equilibrium short-period financial contracts, where poor agents face credit constraints owing to moral hazard and limited liability. If agents have no bargaining power, poor agents have no incentive to save: poverty traps emerge and agents are polarized into two classes, with no interclass mobility. If instead agents have all the bargaining power, strong saving incentives are generated: the wealth of poor and rich agents alike drift upward indefinitely and “history” does not matter eventually.

Social Planning for Hedonistic Altruists

(with Carlo Andreatta), October 2026.

Summary. We study the welfare consequences of social planning for citizens who display hedonistic altruism towards the next generation. A social planner must effectively be more patient than its citizens, even if every citizen has the same discount factor, but the planner also exhibits time inconsistency and has systematic future bias. We presume that successive generations of planners cannot bind one another to a course of action. Our main result states that every equilibrium policy with positive consumption that is nondecreasing in initial output must be either fully Pareto optimal, or “consumption inefficient” in the sense of Malinvaud (1953) and Phelps (1962, 1965). Moreover, we provide sufficient conditions for either outcome to occur.