


GROUPS IN CONFLICT:

Online Appendix [Not For Publication]

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This Appendix presents additional discussion and tables probing the robustness of the results in the main text. Section B.1 provides details about the construction of Figures 1 and 2. Following the discussion in Section 4.3.5 of the paper, Section B.2 provides a simple visualization of our main result. It divides the sample in four groups (countries with/without private/public prizes) and compares for each of the bins the average sizes of groups that have experienced conflict over the sample with those that haven't, see Table B.1. Section B.3 gathers the tables summarized in Section 5 in the main text.

B.1. More Details for Figures 1 and 2. The unit of analysis in Figures 1, 2(a) and 2(b) is the (country-specific) ethnic group. The variable in the Y axis in all three graphs is the SHARE OF CONFLICT YEARS, i.e., the fraction of years the group has been involved in conflict in the 1975–2006 period, (see Section A.1 in the main text for a definition). The variable in the X axis in Figure 1 is group size (SIZE), whereas it's the interaction of SIZE and the average value of OIL and the interaction of SIZE and LACKRIGHTS in Figures 2(a) and 2(b), respectively.

The graphs are binned scatters and similar controls as in our baseline regressions have been partialled out. More specifically, Figure 1 controls for (the average values of) oil, GDP per capita, population, whether the group is in power, Polity, MOUNT, DISTCAP, GROUPAREA, SOILCONST as well as country fixed effects. Figure 2(a) and 2(b) additionally control for SIZE.

B.2. Average Percentage Sizes of Groups in Conflict. The informal analysis here helps visualise our data in the simplest possible way. We classify countries in four groups, depending on whether they are rich/poor in oil reserves and on whether they have low/high levels of LACK RIGHTS.[†] For each category, Table B.1 provides the average size of groups that have never experienced conflict and, in parentheses, similar information corresponding to groups that have experienced conflict in the period considered in our sample. Our theory makes predictions for the main diagonal and this simple analysis confirms the main implications of the theory: the average size of groups in conflict changes dramatically when conflict is over public prizes (where the average size of groups in conflict is 0.16) or over private prizes (where the same figure falls to 0.04).

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[†]To do that, we have first dropped the time dimension of the data by considering for each group the first non-missing value of OIL and LACK RIGHTS. A country is classified as oil rich (poor) if the the oil reserves corresponding to the group with largest reserves in the country are above the overall median. Analogously, a country is classified as low (high) level of LACK RIGHTS if the first non-missing value in the sample is below (above) the median.

AVERAGE SIZE OF GROUPS (IN %) IN PEACE (CONFLICT)		
	LACK RIGHTS low	LACK RIGHTS high
OIL high	6.7% (4.0%)	8.1% (7.0%)
OIL low	18.1% (6.3%)	8.0% (16.0%)

Table B.1. Average Sizes of Groups in Peace and in Conflict. Countries are placed in four categories depending on whether they have high/low values of oil reserves and high/low values of LACK RIGHTS. For each bin, it reports the average percentage size of groups that have never experienced conflict in our sample as well as the average percentage size of groups that *have* experienced conflict (in parentheses). See Footnote † for details on how countries have been assigned to bins.

B.3. Tables for Variations Discussed in the Main Text. Table B.2 explores alternative explanations that could potentially account for our findings; see Section 5.1. Table B.3 considers additional conflict measures; see Section 5.2. Table B.4 shows that results are robust to clustering errors at the country level and at the ethnic homeland and country level (two-way clustering); see Section 5.4. Section B.3.2 and Table B.5 present results estimated by maximum likelihood in a logit specification; this complements Section 5.5. Table B.6 drops various regions of the world for two different specifications of the oil variable, as described in Section 5.6. Tables B.7 and B.8 presents results with group fixed effects and country and year fixed effects, respectively.

B.3.1. More on Table B.5. Table B.5 re-estimates our baseline models using a logit specification. The coefficient of the interactions has the expected signs and are highly significant. Interpreting the coefficients associated with interactions is straightforward in linear models, as they are simply the appropriate cross-partial derivatives of the dependent variable with respect to the relevant variables in the interaction. However, this logic does not extend to nonlinear models, as shown by Ai and Norton (2003). In non-linear models, the cross-partial derivative does not admit a simple interpretation, and important differences arise with respect to the linear case. First, the “true sign” of the interaction does not need to equal the sign of the cross-partial derivative. Second, the significance of that interaction cannot be tested with a simple *t*-test on the coefficient of the interaction term (in the regression). Third, given the nonlinearity, the value of the interaction term depends on all the independent variables of the model. See Ai and Norton(2003) for a discussion.

B.3.2. Interactions in Nonlinear Models. To overcome these difficulties and in order to facilitate the interpretation of the interactions reported in Table B.5, we have evaluated the cross-partial derivative at each of the points in our sample. Panel (a) in Figure B.1 plots the derivative of the dependent variable with respect to SIZE and OIL, using the specification in Column 1, Table B.5. This figure shows that the cross-derivative is negative for most observations in our sample, a result that mimics the one obtained for the linear case. Panel (b) in Figure B.1 plots the z-statistics associated with the cross-partial derivative for each of the points in the sample, together with confidence bands (at the 90 per cent level). This figure shows that the effect is significant in most cases. Similar results are found when interpreting the interaction of SIZE and LACK RIGHTS. In this case, the cross-partial derivative is positive and significant for most of the observations.*

*For brevity, we don’t report the corresponding graphs as they are very similar to those associated with SIZE and OIL.

Dependent Variable: Conflict Incidence										
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]	[9]	[10]
SIZE	0.060*** (0.002)	0.025 (0.345)	0.116*** (0.008)	0.027 (0.477)	0.073*** (0.001)	0.040 (0.161)	0.015 (0.277)	0.032** (0.014)	0.025* (0.057)	0.025* (0.057)
SIZE× OIL	-15.492*** (0.006)	-14.302 (0.101)	-21.317*** (0.001)	-19.167** (0.025)	-16.108*** (0.000)	-17.630** (0.010)				
SIZE× LACK RIGHTS		0.079** (0.037)		0.153** (0.041)		0.093** (0.029)				
OIL	0.782*** (0.002)	0.873* (0.053)	0.991*** (0.006)	0.991** (0.036)	0.932*** (0.001)	0.920** (0.014)	0.576*** (0.009)			
OIL (SHARE)	0.001 (0.803)	-0.001 (0.811)								
OIL PC								-0.010 (0.598)		-0.001 (0.944)
LAND PC									-0.000** (0.037)	-0.000** (0.037)
GIP	-0.003** (0.025)	-0.003 (0.191)	0.002 (0.485)	0.002 (0.546)	-0.004** (0.024)	-0.004 (0.106)	-0.003** (0.045)	-0.003* (0.059)	-0.003** (0.048)	-0.003** (0.048)
GROUPAREA	0.000 (0.229)	0.000 (0.212)	0.000 (0.664)	0.000 (0.770)	0.000 (0.334)	0.000 (0.171)	-0.000 (0.336)	0.000 (0.316)	0.000 (0.212)	0.000 (0.212)
SOILCONST	-0.000 (0.117)	-0.000 (0.479)	-0.000 (0.664)	-0.000 (0.607)	-0.000 (0.114)	-0.001 (0.286)	-0.000 (0.153)	-0.000 (0.333)	-0.000 (0.980)	-0.000 (0.982)
DISTCAP	0.001*** (0.000)	0.002* (0.082)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.002* (0.067)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.002* (0.090)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)
MOUNT	0.002* (0.065)	0.002 (0.191)	0.001 (0.663)	0.001 (0.531)	0.002* (0.079)	0.002 (0.233)	0.002* (0.071)	0.002 (0.163)	0.001 (0.226)	0.001 (0.232)
PARTITIONED	-0.001 (0.491)	-0.000 (0.741)	-0.000 (0.724)	-0.000 (0.710)	-0.001 (0.401)	-0.000 (0.882)	-0.001 (0.419)	-0.001 (0.492)	-0.001 (0.497)	-0.001 (0.496)
LAG	0.904*** (0.000)	0.902*** (0.000)	0.903*** (0.000)	0.903*** (0.000)	0.901*** (0.000)	0.897*** (0.000)	0.905*** (0.000)	0.905*** (0.000)	0.905*** (0.000)	0.905*** (0.000)
R ²	0.810	0.541	0.822	0.822	0.801	0.809	0.810	0.810	0.810	0.810
Obs	63364	39969	34132	34132	55303	34649	62474	62474	62474	62474

Table B.2. Variations: Oil Concentration, Excluded Groups, Small Ruling Elites and Per Capita Payoffs. This table regresses conflict incidence on group size and indices of private and public prizes, along with interactions between subsets of these variables as suggested by the theory. OIL SHARE is the share of oil in the homeland of the group. To compute Columns 3 and 4, excluded groups have been dropped from the sample. Excluded groups are those with a value of (pre-sample) EXCLUDED larger than 0.5. To compute Columns 5 and 6, country/years in which the size of the ruling elite in autocracies is small (as compared to the ruling elite in non-autocracies) have been dropped from the sample (see the main text for details). Columns 8–10 replace total private payoffs (see Column 7) with per capita private payoffs. All regressions contain country-year fixed effects. **p-values** (based on robust standard errors clustered at the group (country) level have been computed in Columns 1, 3, 5 and 7–10 (2, 4 and 6) are reported in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.




Figure B.1. Interpreting Interactions in Nonlinear Models: Logit. These graphs depict the value of the cross-partial derivative of conflict incidence with respect to OIL and SIZE (Panel a) and the z-statistics associated with those estimates (Panel b), for each of the points in the sample. Estimates from Table B.5 (Column 1) have been employed to compute the estimates.

Dependent Variable: Onset [1–3]; % of Years in Conflict [4–6]; % of Onset Years [7–8]								
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]
SIZE	0.014 (0.172)	0.044*** (0.001)	0.015 (0.428)	0.202 (0.353)	0.657** (0.022)	0.171 (0.579)	0.170** (0.021)	0.096 (0.127)
OIL	0.680*** (0.000)	0.812*** (0.000)	0.818** (0.012)	7.522** (0.033)	9.606** (0.019)	10.729** (0.020)	3.065** (0.040)	3.392* (0.053)
SIZE× OIL		-9.165*** (0.000)	-7.357* (0.095)		-142.152** (0.016)	-150.551** (0.021)	-34.983** (0.024)	-38.960** (0.028)
SIZE× LACK RIGHTS			0.048* (0.061)			0.948** (0.014)		0.163* (0.051)
GIP	-0.002** (0.024)	-0.002** (0.018)	-0.002 (0.134)	-0.044** (0.021)	-0.046** (0.016)	-0.050** (0.013)	-0.011* (0.065)	-0.012* (0.062)
GROUPAREA	-0.000** (0.016)	-0.000 (0.243)	-0.000 (0.462)	(0.607) (0.607)	(0.509) (0.509)	(0.203) (0.203)	(0.915) (0.915)	(0.512) (0.512)
SOILCONST	-0.000 (0.130)	-0.000* (0.077)	-0.001 (0.197)	-0.005 0.012	-0.006 0.013	-0.004 0.023	-0.002 0.004	-0.002 0.008
DISTCAP	0.001** (0.011)	0.001*** (0.008)	0.000 (0.912)	0.012 (0.204)	0.013 (0.195)	0.023 (0.154)	0.004 (0.197)	0.008 (0.156)
MOUNT	0.002** (0.026)	0.002** (0.021)	0.002 (0.126)	0.021** (0.046)	0.023** (0.037)	0.023* (0.067)	0.007* (0.062)	0.006 (0.126)
PARTITIONED	-0.000 (0.863)	-0.000 (0.842)	0.001 (0.196)	-0.007 (0.426)	-0.007 (0.419)	-0.009 (0.398)	-0.002 (0.239)	-0.003 (0.207)
PEACEYRS	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)					
R ²	0.026	0.026	0.036	0.362	0.364	0.366	0.232	0.234
Obs	62762	62762	39653	1475	1475	1345	1474	1344

Table B.3. Group Size and Conflict: Alternative Dependent Variables. This table regresses conflict onset (Columns 1–3), the share of conflict years (Columns 4–6) and the share of onset years (Column 7–8) on group size and indices of private and public prizes, along with interactions between subsets of these variables as implied by the theory. Country-year fixed effects are included in Columns 1–3, while Columns 4–8 include country fixed effects. *p*-values in parentheses: **p* < 0.10, ***p* < 0.05, ****p* < 0.01.

Dependent Variable: Conflict Incidence										
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]	[9]	[10]
SIZE	0.001 (0.975)	0.025 (0.355)	0.034 (0.214)	-0.008 (0.759)	0.001 (0.975)	0.010 (0.744)	0.116** (0.043)	0.023 (0.393)	0.036 (0.204)	0.024 (0.388)
SIZE× OIL	-13.410*** (0.003)	-15.432*** (0.001)			-55.681*** (0.008)			-13.998*** (0.001)	-14.906*** (0.000)	-13.668*** (0.002)
SIZE× LACK RIGHTS	0.067** (0.034)	0.078** (0.016)	0.079** (0.019)	0.092*** (0.006)	0.078** (0.017)	0.079** (0.035)	0.050 (0.175)			
SIZE × OIL ₀₋₂₅			-0.008 (0.928)							
SIZE × OIL ₂₅₋₅₀			0.306 (0.445)							
SIZE × OIL ₅₀₋₇₅			-0.164** (0.012)							
SIZE × OIL _{>75}			-0.133*** (0.001)							
SIZE× OIL COUNTRY				-7.531* (0.069)	43.541** (0.031)					
SIZE× MINES						-0.015** (0.045)				
SIZE× HOME							-0.418*** (0.001)			
SIZE× AUTOC								0.100*** (0.008)		
SIZE× EXCLUDED									0.100*** (0.010)	
SIZE× CHILD MORTALITY										0.004* (0.092)
OIL	0.749** (0.018)	0.845*** (0.009)		0.714** (0.023)	0.900*** (0.006)	0.550* (0.075)	0.431 (0.113)	0.801*** (0.005)	0.752*** (0.007)	0.847*** (0.005)
OIL ₀₋₂₅			-0.002 (0.160)							
OIL ₂₅₋₅₀			-0.002 (0.301)							
OIL ₅₀₋₇₅			0.006*** (0.006)							
OIL _{>75}			0.006** (0.024)							
MINES						0.000 (0.867)				
HOME							0.023** (0.016)			
EXCLUDED									0.003 (0.178)	
GIP		-0.003 (0.125)	-0.003 (0.118)	-0.003 (0.153)	-0.004* (0.054)	-0.002 (0.230)	-0.004** (0.029)	-0.003 (0.118)		-0.003 (0.185)
GROUPAREA		0.000* (0.090)	0.000* (0.096)	0.000 (0.338)	0.000 (0.187)	0.000 (0.187)		0.000 (0.594)	0.000 (0.293)	0.000 (0.480)
SOILCONST		-0.000 (0.331)	-0.000 (0.283)	-0.000 (0.397)	-0.000 (0.342)	-0.001 (0.229)	-0.001 (0.231)	-0.001** (0.020)	-0.001** (0.027)	-0.001** (0.033)
DISTCAP		0.002*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.001)	0.001*** (0.001)	0.001*** (0.000)
MOUNT		0.002 (0.266)	0.001 (0.305)	0.002 (0.271)	0.001 (0.295)	0.002 (0.285)	0.002 (0.300)	0.002 (0.136)	0.002* (0.079)	0.002 (0.128)
PARTITIONED		-0.000 (0.744)	-0.000 (0.696)	-0.000 (0.743)	-0.000 (0.682)	-0.000 (0.917)	-0.000 (0.705)	-0.000 (0.708)	-0.000 (0.813)	-0.000 (0.727)
LAG	0.902*** (0.000)	0.902*** (0.000)	0.901*** (0.000)	0.902*** (0.000)	0.901*** (0.000)	0.895*** (0.000)	0.902*** (0.000)	0.899*** (0.000)	0.901*** (0.000)	0.901*** (0.000)
R ²	0.818	0.818	0.818	0.818	0.818	0.809	0.820	0.811	0.811	0.809
Obs	39969	39969	39969	39969	39969	34639	38689	42757	51258	41065

Table B.4. Robustness to Clustering Errors at the Country Level and at the Country and Group Level (Two-Way Clustering). This table regresses conflict incidence on group size and indices of private and public prizes, along with interactions between subsets of these variables as suggested by the theory. All regressions contain country-year and fixed effects. This table is identical to Table 3 in the main text, but here standard errors have been clustered at the country and group level (two way clustering). A group living in two different countries is considered as one group, as opposed to the rest of the exercise where ethnic groups are country specific. **p-values**, based on robust standard errors clustering at the group and country level, are reported in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Dependent Variable: Conflict Incidence			
	[1]	[2]	[3]
SIZE	23.335*** (0.000)	-45.110** (0.017)	-36.056* (0.060)
OIL	238.701*** (0.000)	146.751*** (0.002)	219.445*** (0.000)
SIZE × OIL	-8104.561*** (0.000)		-8232.461*** (0.000)
SIZE × LACK RIGHTS		77.826*** (0.005)	89.045*** (0.003)
GIP	-0.460* (0.074)	-0.129 (0.666)	-0.072 (0.797)
GROUPAREA	0.000 (0.685)	-0.001 (0.455)	-0.000 (0.924)
SOILCONST	-0.220 (0.125)	0.107 (0.608)	-0.006 (0.972)
DISTCAP	0.558*** (0.000)	0.968*** (0.003)	0.966*** (0.005)
MOUNT	0.633*** (0.008)	0.504 (0.127)	0.627** (0.049)
PARTITIONED	-0.151 (0.326)	-0.113 (0.565)	-0.107 (0.571)
GDP	0.402** (0.013)	0.384 (0.295)	0.404 (0.276)
POP	1.898** (0.025)	2.097 (0.311)	2.273 (0.281)
POLITY	-0.144 (0.259)	0.086 (0.677)	0.077 (0.707)
LAG	7.328*** (0.000)	7.302*** (0.000)	7.255*** (0.000)
Pseudo-R ²	0.819	0.817	0.819
Obs	26806	18132	18132

Table B.5. Group Size and Conflict: Non-Linear Models. Conflict incidence is regressed on group size and indices of private and public prizes, along with interactions between subsets of these variables as implied by the theory. Estimation uses maximum likelihood in a Logit model. All regressions contain year dummies and country fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the group level have been computed. p -values are reported in parentheses: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Dependent Variable: Conflict Incidence												
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]	[9]	[10]	[11]	[12]
SIZE	0.063*** (0.001)	0.022 (0.404)	0.060*** (0.003)	0.014 (0.611)	0.055*** (0.003)	0.019 (0.471)	0.045** (0.020)	0.035 (0.229)	0.053** (0.010)	0.025 (0.309)	0.087*** (0.000)	0.053 (0.167)
OIL	0.884*** (0.003)	0.851* (0.052)	0.930*** (0.001)	1.166*** (0.001)	0.736*** (0.005)	0.734 (0.106)	0.660*** (0.007)	0.670 (0.104)	0.641*** (0.010)	0.672 (0.180)	0.984*** (0.002)	1.066* (0.053)
SIZE× OIL	-15.935*** (0.000)	-15.039** (0.023)	-14.887*** (0.000)	-18.728*** (0.003)	-13.338*** (0.000)	-13.408* (0.055)	-11.343*** (0.003)	-14.915** (0.033)	-8.734** (0.018)	-8.587 (0.161)	-20.140*** (0.000)	-21.334** (0.020)
SIZE× LACK RIGHTS		0.082* (0.054)		0.096** (0.048)		0.075* (0.052)		0.072* (0.053)		0.043 (0.121)		0.070* (0.080)
GIP	-0.003** (0.030)	-0.003 (0.206)	-0.002 (0.234)	-0.001 (0.653)	-0.003* (0.072)	-0.002 (0.346)	-0.003 (0.134)	-0.002 (0.302)	-0.006*** (0.000)	-0.006** (0.011)	-0.003** (0.049)	-0.002 (0.250)
GROUPAREA	0.000 (0.146)	0.000 (0.199)	0.000 (0.897)	0.000 (0.247)	0.000 (0.531)	0.000 (0.226)	0.000 (0.581)	0.000 (0.205)	0.000 (0.281)	0.000* (0.062)	0.000 (0.636)	0.000 (0.220)
SOILCONST	-0.000 (0.671)	-0.000 (0.470)	0.000 (0.655)	0.000 (0.721)	-0.000 (0.140)	-0.000 (0.765)	-0.000 (0.107)	-0.000 (0.635)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.003)	-0.001* (0.064)	-0.001 (0.373)
DISTCAP	0.002*** (0.000)	0.002* (0.086)	0.000 (0.333)	0.001 (0.258)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.002* (0.075)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.002* (0.084)	0.001*** (0.001)	0.002 (0.176)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.002* (0.097)
MOUNT	0.002 (0.171)	0.002 (0.209)	0.002 (0.145)	0.001 (0.699)	0.002 (0.119)	0.001 (0.343)	0.002 (0.104)	0.001 (0.360)	0.002** (0.045)	0.003** (0.019)	0.002* (0.075)	0.002 (0.157)
PARTITIONED	-0.001 (0.533)	-0.000 (0.766)	-0.001 (0.296)	-0.001 (0.478)	-0.001 (0.281)	-0.001 (0.415)	-0.000 (0.737)	-0.000 (0.781)	0.001 (0.221)	0.002* (0.072)	-0.001 (0.403)	-0.001 (0.665)
LAG	0.907*** (0.000)	0.903*** (0.000)	0.894*** (0.000)	0.893*** (0.000)	0.903*** (0.000)	0.901*** (0.000)	0.912*** (0.000)	0.911*** (0.000)	0.890*** (0.000)	0.888*** (0.000)	0.905*** (0.000)	0.904*** (0.000)
R ²	0.816	0.820	0.796	0.804	0.808	0.817	0.821	0.831	0.786	0.798	0.812	0.823
Obs	57752	38681	44558	26896	61499	38037	55132	33362	54577	33255	53660	32924
Dropped Region	EX-USSR	EX-USSR	ASIA	ASIA	MID. EAST	MID. EAST	W-SA FR.	W-S AFR.	E-C AFR.	E-C AFR.	LATIN AM.	LATIN AM.

Table B.6. Dropping Regions of the World. This table reproduces Column 3 in Table 1 and Column 2 in Table 3 dropping regions of the world. Regions dropped are: former USSR countries (Columns 1 and 2), Asia (Columns 3 and 4), the Middle East (Columns 5 and 6), West-South Africa (Columns 7 and 8), East and Central Africa (Columns 9 and 10), and Latin America (Columns 11 and 12). All regressions contain year dummies and country fixed effects. *p*-values are reported in parentheses. **p* < 0.10, ***p* < 0.05, ****p* < 0.01.

Dependent Variable: Conflict Incidence				
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
OIL	-0.094 (0.778)		-0.305 (0.375)	
SIZE × OIL	-8.680** (0.011)			
SIZE × OIL ₀₋₂₅		0.051 (0.591)		
SIZE × OIL ₂₅₋₅₀		0.075 (0.454)		
SIZE × OIL ₅₀₋₇₅		-0.107** (0.020)		
SIZE × OIL _{>75}		-0.100*** (0.003)		
SIZE × MINES			-0.009* (0.051)	
SIZE × PRIVATE INDEX				-0.031*** (0.004)
OIL _{>75}		0.002 (0.447)		
OIL ₅₀₋₇₅		-0.001 (0.748)		
OIL ₂₅₋₅₀		-0.004** (0.043)		
OIL ₀₋₂₅		-0.005*** (0.002)		
MINES			0.000 (0.723)	
PRIVATE INDEX				-0.000 (0.943)
GIP	-0.000 (0.853)	-0.000 (0.895)	-0.001 (0.733)	-0.000 (0.921)
GDP	0.004** (0.049)	0.005** (0.036)	0.004** (0.049)	0.004** (0.035)
POLITY	-0.003* (0.056)	-0.003** (0.045)	-0.003* (0.058)	-0.003** (0.044)
POP	-0.000 (0.745)	-0.000 (0.941)	-0.000 (0.811)	-0.000 (0.536)
LAG	0.924*** (0.000)	0.924*** (0.000)	0.924*** (0.000)	0.924*** (0.000)
Obs	55289	55289	55289	54486

Table B.7. Group Fixed Effects. This table regresses conflict incidence on group size and indices of private prizes, along with interactions between subsets of these variables as suggested by the theory. Group and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Regressions are estimated system GMM (Blundell and Bond, 1998). *p-values*, based on robust standard errors clustered at the group level, are reported in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Dependent Variable: Conflict Incidence										
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]	[9]	[10]
SIZE	-0.012 (0.570)	0.011 (0.656)	0.022 (0.412)	-0.014 (0.543)	-0.006 (0.788)	0.004 (0.893)	0.110 (0.118)	0.014 (0.587)	0.031 (0.305)	0.012 (0.656)
SIZE× OIL	-11.270* (0.060)	-12.836** (0.026)			-42.570* (0.085)			-12.554** (0.025)	-13.350*** (0.001)	-11.696** (0.046)
SIZE× LACK RIGHTS	0.073* (0.067)	0.083** (0.035)	0.083* (0.050)	0.095** (0.023)	0.083** (0.033)	0.086* (0.086)	0.067 (0.134)			
SIZE × OIL ₀₋₂₅			0.033 (0.761)							
SIZE × OIL ₂₅₋₅₀			0.182 (0.551)							
SIZE × OIL ₅₀₋₇₅			-0.166** (0.027)							
SIZE × OIL _{>75}			-0.118*** (0.005)							
SIZE× OIL COUNTRY				-6.860 (0.155)	31.988 (0.170)					
SIZE× MINES						-0.013* (0.099)				
SIZE× HOME							-0.331** (0.034)			
SIZE× AUTO C								0.097** (0.013)		
SIZE× EXCLUDED									0.098** (0.015)	
SIZE× CHILD MORTALITY										0.004 (0.137)
OIL	0.700 (0.122)	0.828* (0.069)		0.729* (0.098)	0.864* (0.061)	0.482 (0.251)	0.515 (0.165)	0.841* (0.052)	0.710** (0.018)	0.796* (0.074)
OIL ₀₋₂₅			-0.003 (0.393)							
OIL ₂₅₋₅₀			-0.002 (0.600)							
OIL ₅₀₋₇₅			0.005* (0.064)							
OIL _{>75}			0.007** (0.029)							
MINES						0.000 (0.938)				
EXCLUDED									0.003 (0.233)	
HOME							0.014 (0.186)			
GIP		-0.003 (0.246)	-0.003 (0.253)	-0.002 (0.278)	-0.003 (0.176)	-0.002 (0.380)	-0.004 (0.101)	-0.003 (0.243)		-0.002 (0.361)
GROUPAREA		0.000 (0.289)	0.000 (0.338)	0.000 (0.592)	0.000 (0.404)	0.000 (0.340)		0.000 (0.684)	0.000 (0.297)	0.000 (0.582)
SOILCONST		-0.001 (0.399)	-0.001 (0.358)	-0.000 (0.452)	-0.001 (0.404)	-0.001 (0.264)	-0.001 (0.333)	-0.001 (0.121)	-0.001* (0.067)	-0.001 (0.153)
DISTCAP		0.003* (0.085)	0.002* (0.085)	0.002* (0.092)	0.003* (0.072)	0.002 (0.123)	0.003* (0.074)	0.002 (0.121)	0.002*** (0.001)	0.002 (0.112)
MOUNT		0.002 (0.107)	0.002 (0.100)	0.002 (0.110)	0.002 (0.121)	0.002 (0.191)	0.002 (0.124)	0.003* (0.057)	0.003* (0.061)	0.003* (0.071)
PARTITIONED		-0.001 (0.444)	-0.001 (0.431)	-0.001 (0.447)	-0.001 (0.415)	-0.001 (0.693)	-0.001 (0.431)	-0.001 (0.411)	-0.001 (0.531)	-0.001 (0.450)
POP	-0.001 (0.886)	-0.001 (0.878)	-0.001 (0.884)	-0.001 (0.874)	-0.001 (0.896)	-0.003 (0.786)	-0.001 (0.864)	-0.002 (0.823)	-0.001 (0.711)	-0.001 (0.879)
GDP	0.003 (0.318)	0.003 (0.324)	0.003 (0.320)	0.003 (0.326)	0.003 (0.315)	0.005 (0.199)	0.003 (0.346)	0.002 (0.340)	0.003** (0.025)	0.003 (0.352)
POLITY	-0.001 (0.502)	-0.001 (0.511)	-0.001 (0.512)	-0.001 (0.511)	-0.001 (0.523)	-0.001 (0.494)	-0.001 (0.532)	-0.001 (0.509)	0.001 (0.405)	-0.001 (0.452)
LAG	0.901*** (0.000)	0.900*** (0.000)	0.900*** (0.000)	0.900*** (0.000)	0.900*** (0.000)	0.890*** (0.000)	0.900*** (0.000)	0.899*** (0.000)	0.898*** (0.000)	0.898*** (0.000)
R ²	0.855	0.855	0.855	0.855	0.855	0.843	0.855	0.852	0.855	0.850
Obs	38341	38341	38341	38341	38341	32026	37659	39394	45330	36839

Table B.8. Country and Year Fixed Effects. This table regresses conflict incidence on group size and indices of private and public prizes, along with interactions between subsets of these variables as suggested by the theory. This table is identical to Table 3 in the main text, but country-year fixed effects have been replaced by separate country and year fixed effects. **p-values**, based on robust standard errors and clustered at the country level are reported in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.